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•	The slackening of important economic reforms under 
president Hu Jintao and prime minister Wen Jiabao (2002-
2012), as well as the stimulus measures taken in response 
to the 2008 crisis to boost investments, have all led to 
a huge build-up of debt and created imbalances in the Chi-
nese economy, including in the financial markets and the 
industrial sector. As China’s original drivers of growth 
have been waning, stagnation of the reform process could 
lead to a serious economic crisis and, consequently, de-
prive the Chinese leadership of the main factor legitimis-
ing the Communist Party of China, i.e. the constantly im-
proving standards of living in China.
•	When the new generation of leaders came to power in Chi-
na, with Xi Jinping as president and Li Keqiang as the head 
of government, the Chinese leadership showed a strong 
ambition to overcome the status quo and resume reforms. 
A new draft reform agenda was presented in November 
2013 during the third plenum of the CPC Central Commit-
tee, one year after the party’s 18th congress. The key pledge 
that president Xi Jinping made at that time was to give 
market forces a ‘decisive role’ in the Chinese economy. The 
intention of the changes made ‘in the spirit of the third 
plenum’ was to break up the state monopolies, deregulate 
the real economy and the financial sector, restrict the role 
of state-owned enterprises (SOE), provide administrative 
support to private companies and open the Chinese econo-
my to foreign capital. The reforms were intended to create 
a new impulse for growth by resolving the fundamental 
problem of the Chinese economy, i.e. the faulty and politi-
cised resource allocation system.
•	In the past, the high level of state intervention in the 















sector and the state-owned financial system, as well as 
the central and local-level bureaucracy, to reap extraor-
dinary profits from economic growth. The new leader-
ship regarded the vested interests which grew out of that 
situation as an influential political force interested in 
preserving the profitable status quo, and the main line of 
resistance to further reforms.
•	The move to centralise decision-making on economic re-
forms, one of president Xi Jinping’s key decisions taken 
after the third plenum, was guided by the logic of coun-
tering the vested interests resisting reforms. In Novem-
ber 2013, the so-called Central Leading Group for Compre-
hensively Deepening Reforms was created. It became the 
key element in the ‘transmission belt’ of the Chinese re-
form process, giving Xi direct control of the most impor-
tant changes and an instrument to overcome resistance 
within the bureaucracy. The anti-corruption campaign 
launched in 2013 was also an important tool for the im-
plementation of reforms. While it was intended to serve 
wider objectives, it became instrumental in consolidating 
power, rapidly replacing the bureaucratic cadres and dis-
ciplining the officials in charge of the economy at all levels 
of the state administration.
•	The new tools for implementing reform turned out to be 
marred by several defects, which contributed to further 
stagnation of reforms, while the concentration of deci-
sion-making powers in the hands of president Xi Jinping 
and his closest circle distorted the process of economic 
policy development. The government became margin-
alised and reduced to the role of an implementing body, 
which triggered a conflict over the division of competenc-
es between prime minister Li Keqiang and president Xi 
Jinping’s circle, while also diffusing the responsibility for 















resulting vacuum allowed certain groups associated with 
the bureaucracy and interested in preserving the status 
quo to take over the initiative, of which the reform of 
state-owned enterprises is a case in point. The structure 
of the Central Leading Group has proven effective in ini-
tiating change but has not worked so well in sequencing 
actions and has created bottlenecks in the reform ‘trans-
mission belt’.
•	The changes initiated by Xi Jinping have reshaped the 
original relations between local governments in China 
and the central government in Beijing. However, despite 
partial centralisation, the success of reforms still de-
pends on the involvement of the local administrations, 
which are often interested in maintaining the status quo 
because of the still unresolved local government budget 
problems and the inconsistencies in Beijing’s actions and 
expectations. Another reason why the officials in charge 
of implementing reforms tend to be passive concerns their 
reluctance to take any risky decisions in the context of 
the ongoing anti-corruption campaign. 
•	The slowing down of China’s economic growth has forced 
the country’s top decision makers to modify their vision 
of economic reforms on many occasions. At critical mo-
ments, e.g. during the government interventions in Chi-
na’s exchange markets or the restructuring of the pro-
vincial government’s debt, Beijing has tended to opt for 
deep interventions in the economy, which run counter to 
the ‘spirit of the third plenum’ and exacerbate existing 
problems. While the Chinese leaders seem to agree that 
reforms need to continue, a dispute is mounting within 
the top ranks of leadership about whether it is still nec-
essary to employ stimulus measures while implementing 
the reforms. Continuing with the same stimulus methods 















the problems of the Chinese economy, contributing to its 
further destabilisation.
•	The 19th Congress of the Communist Party of China, sched-
uled for the autumn of 2017, will bring about a ‘new open-
ing’ in the key bodies of the CPC, which will probably 
allow Xi Jinping to fully consolidate his grip on economic 
policy. However, fixing the foundations of China’s econo-
my by resuming the agenda of the third plenum will re-
quire the CPC leaders to employ a considerable organisa-
tional and political resources, which will inevitably have 
to be diverted from other areas of governance. The fate of 
reforms will therefore depend on the individual calcula-
tions of Xi Jinping and his inner circle, who will have to 
weigh up the long-term benefits for the state and the party 
if China is put on a stable growth path against the short-
term gains from the resolution of emerging economic, so-


















of	 its	 ‘reform	and	opening-up’	 policy	path,	 on	which	China	had	





























































i. starting point for furthEr rEform
The	 economic	 policy	 objectives	 and	 agenda	 of	 the	 new	 Chinese	
leadership	with	Xi	Jinping	at	the	helm	had	to	be	focused,	at	least	
in	the	early	period,	on	resolving	the	existing	problems	inherited	
from	 predecessors.	The	 strong	 emphasis	 on	what	 had	 been	 ne-















been	gradually	mounting	 since	 the	beginning	of	 the	 ‘reform	and	
opening-up’	period,	became	evident	in	the	form	of	rapidly	deepen-






This	 entailed	 adopting	 a	 more	 moderate	 course	 of	 economic	 re-
forms	and	partly	changing	the	priorities	of	China’s	transformation.
As the key reforms had come to a halt, the spectacular ex-















century occurred in a strongly regulated business en-
vironment in which market mechanisms remained re-
strained and were still subordinated to the state’s develop-
ment goals.	Even	though	the	prices	of	nearly	all	commodities	
had	 been	 liberalised,	 the	 planning	 institutions	 continued	 to	
control	the	prices	of	the	basic	means	of	production	crucial	for	
the	economy,	such	as	energy	and	raw	materials,	as	well	as	in-
terest	 rates	 on	 deposits.	 The	 state	 also	 indirectly	 influenced	




was	regulated	more	 tightly	 than	 in	other	economies.	The	key	
economic	sectors,	 including	energy,	banking	and	 telecommu-
nications,	 also	 remained	 strongly	 regulated	 and	monopolised	
by	state-owned	companies,	which	additionally	benefited	from	
subsidies	and	bankruptcy	protection	measures.	
In a decision of fundamental importance for China’s future 
economic development, the Hu-Wen team assigned an im-
portant role in stimulating economic growth to the public 
sector.	Even	though	some	enterprises	had	been	deeply	restruc-
tured	 or	 liquidated	 in	 the	 late	 1990s,	 China	 still	 had	 around	































the	 Chinese	 government	 had	 all	 the	 instruments	 it	 needed	 to	
continue	applying	its	model	of	state-controlled	economic	growth	
based	on	multi-level	planning.	However,	as	the	Chinese	economy	






development	 objectives.	The resulting market signal distor-
tions engendered the fundamental weakness of the Chinese 
economic system, i.e. the systemic misallocation of econom-
ic resources. The problem surfaced most visibly during the 
2008 crisis when the Chinese leadership launched its massive 
stimulus operation.









































An important element in the implementation of the stimu-
lus concerned delegating responsibilities to local levels of 
governments, i.e. provincial, county and city governments.	
Hoping	to	benefit	from	the	huge	investment	funds	and	lucrative	
contracts	 for	 local	 political-business	 groups,	 the	 local	 adminis-
trations	responded	enthusiastically	 to	 the	announcement	of	 the	
stimulus	 package:	 within	 a	 short	 period	 after	 the	 programme	
was	 announced,	 the	Central	National	Development	 and	Reform	
Commission	 received	 project	 applications	worth	 a	 total	 of	 CNY	
18	trillion.4	This	massive	collective	undertaking,	however,	stum-
bled	on	the	absence	of	adequate	sources	of	financing.	The	central	
government	had	committed	only	CNY	1.18	trillion,	 i.e.	 less	 than	
30%5	of	 the	total	stimulus	package	amount,	while	 the	 local	gov-
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financial	 institutions	 was	 close	 to	 CNY	 40	 trillion,	 i.e.	 had	 in-
creased	by	as	much	as	32%	over	 the	previous	year.6	Responding	
to	 the	 first	 negative	 effects	 of	 flooding	 the	markets	 with	 extra	
capital	(such	as	the	marked	growth	of	housing	prices	in	late	2009	
and	 early	 2010),	 the	 central	 government	 introduced	 a	 series	 of	
regulations	 to	 limit	money	supply.	Credit	 limits	 for	banks	were	
tightened	and	regulations	were	adopted	to	constrain	the	inflating	
speculative	bubble	in	the	housing	market.	
Chart 2. Increase in the volume of CNY-denominated loans out-
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This tighter monetary policy created an enormous pressure 
on those entities which had borrowed money to start large-
scale investments that were not always economically viable 






















as	 intermediaries	 and	 benefitting	 financially	 without	 burden-












in	 the	 real	 economy,	 the	 financial	 system	 and	 public	 finance.	
Resolving	them	became	the	principal	challenge	for	president	Xi	
Jinping’s	team	which	came	to	power	in	2012.	However, the orig-
inal stimulus model had already brought about certain con-
sequences which constitute a fundamental limitation on the 








8	 Douglas	Eliott	et al.,	Shadow	Banking	in	China:	A	Primer,	Economic Stud-
















The massive corporate debt pile is the principal challenge 
faced by the Chinese economy. Even	 though	 the	 increase	 in	





in	 2005	 to	 247%	 of	 GDP	 in	 2015,	with	 corporate	 debt	 account-
ing	for	two	thirds	of	that	figure.9	On	top	of	that,	the	the	degree	





mounting	 debt	 generates	 increasingly	 subpar	 growth.	 Mean-
while,	 the	 fate	of	 the	 sectors	which	embarked	upon	expensive	
long-term	investments	in	the	period	of	weaker	growth	depends	



































China’s financial system has been growing bigger, less trans-













corporate	 stock	 and	bond	markets,	 generating	 speculative	 bub-
bles	that	pose	a	serious	problem	for	the	government.
The investment stimulus has led to overproduction in the 
housing sector and a substantial increase in the number of 
uninhabited new dwellings.	 In	 the	 course	of	 the	main	 stimu-
lus	operation	 in	2009	and	the	 further	stimulus	measures	 taken	
via	the	LGFVs,	investments	(in	the	public	sector	as	well	as	in	the	
private	 sector,	 which	 has	 responded	 strongly	 to	 the	 construc-


























Using the SOE sector as a means of stimulating the econo-
my has considerably suppressed its profitability, which de-
creased from 5% in 2007 to around 2.2% in 2015.13 Importantly,	
state-owned	companies	are	usually	protected	against	bankruptcy	
through	direct	 interventions	or	arrangements	allowing	them	to	
roll	 their	 debt	 indefinitely,	 for	 political	 and	 image-related	 rea-
sons.	They	also	benefit	from	informal	links	to	the	CPC	structures	
and	more	favourable	investment	risk	ratings	based	on	the	expec-
tation	 that	 the	 state	will	provide	financial	assistance	 if	needed,	






Channelling massive funds to investments and the privi-
leged treatment of state-owned capital have engendered the 
phenomenon of guojin mintui (‘the state advances, the private 
sector retreats’) in China.	The	weaker	 competitive	position	 of	










Steel	 Industry,	 PIIE,	 5.06.2016,	 https://piie.com/blogs/china-economic-
watch/state-play-chinese-steel-industry,	我国煤炭行业产能家底基本摸清, 
Jingji	 Ribao,	 12.01.2016,	 http://www.ce.cn/xwzx/gnsz/gdxw/201601/12/
t20160112_8203711.shtml
13	 Return-on-assets (ROA). See:	Andrew	Batson,	Villains	or	Victims?	The	role	

























Sustaining the current stimulus model should be treated as 



































ii. rEconstruction in thE ‘spirit of thE 
third plEnum’
1.  A new impulse for change…
In	 late	 2013,	 having	 preliminarily	 consolidated	 its	 power	 after	
one	year	in	office,	the	new	Chinese	leadership	presented	an	ambi-
tious	economic	reform	agenda	which	directly	addressed	China’s	
mounting	 problems.	Xi Jinping personally took over respon-
sibility for drafting the official reform programme, thus en-
croaching on the economic policy competences traditionally 
vested in the prime minister.	During	 the	 third	plenum	of	 the	
18th	National	Congress	of	the	CPC,	the	Plan	for	Comprehensively	








The central point of the new economic reform agenda was the 
pledge to change the role of the state in the economy and grant 
market forces ‘a decisive role’ – it was formulated to address 





of	 capital	 by	developing	 state-of-the-art	 capital	markets	 and	al-
lowing	the	private	sector	to	open	small	and	medium-sized	banks.	
15	 Decision	of	 the	Central	Committee	of	 the	Communist	Party	of	China	on	
Some	Major	 Issues	Concerning	Comprehensively	Deepening	 the	Reform	





















abolished,	 that	 monopolistic	 practices	 and	 unfair	 competition	
would	be	combated,	and	that	formal	barriers	to	engaging	in	busi-
ness	activity	would	be	removed.	
Prominent in the new reform agenda were projects to im-
prove the state of local budgets while strengthening central 















(i.e.	 provincial	 government	 and	 central	 government),	 and	 that	
transfers	from	central	government	would	increase.	
One of the most important pledges in the new reform agenda 
concerned a limited reform of the state-owned enterprise 
sector, which had enjoyed privileged access to resources de-






















supervisory	 institution,	 but	 instead	 –	 by	 specially	 established	






role	 in	 the	economy	and	continue	 to	 serve	as	an	economic	poli-





2. ... and the drifting of key reforms
The capital markets, which were expected to improve the fi-
nancial situation of SOEs and offer better access to capital to 
the most efficient sectors of the economy, did undergo some 
degree of liberalisation. However, responding to a series of 
shocks in Chinese markets, the government moved to im-
plement a series of measures which strengthened the state’s 
control of the economy, quite against the ‘spirit of the third 
plenum’. The	deepest	 regression	 occurred	 in	 the	 Chinese	 stock	





















financial	 institutions,	which	 further	 increased	 the	 pressure	 on	







capital	 account	 –	 and	 here	 the	 Chinese	 leaders	 are	 acting	 cau-
tiously	because	of	the	risk	of	sudden	capital	outflows.
Relatively large progress has been made in reforming Chi-
na’s banking system, which is of crucial importance from 
the point of view of improving the allocation of capital in 
the economy and increasing Chinese consumers’ purchasing 
power. However, the banking sector’s condition worsened 
again after the banks were engaged in some ad hoc interven-




ated,	 and	 licences	were	 granted	 to	 a	 certain	 number	 of	 private	
banks.	This	 contributed	 to	 increasing	 competition	 in	 the	 sector	
and	a	strengthening	of	the	position	of	smaller	banks.	However,	the	
state-owned	 sector	 remains	 dominant,	 with	 smaller	 provincial	
and	city	banks	gaining	importance,	which	increases	the	exposure	


























Fiscal reforms have gained momentum, with visible changes 
in taxes and the budget and debt governance system. How-
ever, the measures taken so far have eased the pressures on 
local governments only temporarily, without providing them 
with stable sources of revenue that would allow them to ser-
vice their debt. In their final form, the reforms also lack the 
initially envisaged ‘pro-market’ component and lead to great-
er pressures on the banking sector. Beginning	in	2014,	a	num-
ber	of	measures	have	been	 taken	 in	China	 to	make	 it	 easier	 for	
local	governments	 to	service	 their	debt,	e.g.	by	abolishing	some	
restrictions	 on	 borrowing	 and	 opening	 the	 possibility	 for	 local	
governments	 to	 issue	 bonds,	 which	made	 them	 less	 dependent	
on	 the	 shadow	banking	 sector.	The	activities	of	 the	LGFVs	have	


































the	 measure	 was	 implemented	 on	 terms	 that	 contradicted	 the	
‘spirit	of	the	third	plenum’.
The	 central	 government	 has	 also	 introduced	 several	 changes	 to	
local-level	 budgetary	 planning	 rules,	 imposing	 regulations	 on	
the	drafting	of	multiannual	budgets	and	measures	to	improve	the	
transparency	of	 spending.	However,	 the	 reforms	have	not	been	
fully	implemented	because	of	the	resistance	of	local	government	
officials	who	tend	to	sabotage	co-operation	with	the	central	gov-




ments.	The	 reform	 entails	 a	wider	 application	 of	VAT,	 and	VAT	
revenues	are	channelled	to	the	central	budget	to	a	wider	degree	
than	revenues	from	the	previously	applicable	business	tax	were.	





The reform of the centrally managed SOEs (yangqi) started 
with a significant, two-year delay. Owing to the large num-
ber of central institutions involved and their contradictory 
visions of what needs to be done, the detailed reform agenda 
is inconsistent and at times internally contradictory. So far 
there has been little progress on its implementation and the 
original objectives of the third plenum have been achieved to 
























as	 a	 commitment	 to	 strengthen	 the	 role	 of	 the	 CPC	 structures	
in	nominating	managers.	The	official	documents	also	contain	no	




The implementation of the reform has also been delayed by 
conflicts over the division of responsibilities, surfacing dur-
ing the formulation of detailed reform plans:	for	instance,	the	
SOE	reform	was	designed	by	the	relatively	pro-market	Ministry	
of	Finance	but	its	 implementation,	after	a	 long	impasse,	became	
the	 responsibility	 of	 the	 government	 and	officials	with	 links	 to	






part	of	 the	mixed	ownership	 reforms.	The	most	notable	 change	
implemented	 so	 far	 concerns	 the	 launch	 of	 a	 series	 of	mergers	
between	 the	centrally	managed	SOEs,	 leading	 to	 the	emergence	





































The Chinese government responded to the stagnation of the 
third plenum’s agenda by launching a supply-side reform in 
2015.	The	 umbrella	 term	 encompasses	 various	 solutions	 which	




overcapacity,	 reducing	 oversupply	 in	 the	 property	market,	 and	
lowering	the	cost	of	doing	business.	Most	of	the	measures	taken	
to	 date	 concern	 overcapacity:	 the	 central	 institutions	 have	 set	
quotas	for	the	reduction	of	production	capacity	over	the	next	five	






















intended	 to	 support	 businesses.	The	 new	 reform	 plans	 also	 en-
































which	 also	 included	 taking	personal	 control	 of	 the	 army.27	This	







1. Reform as a way to combat vested interests
From	the	very	start,	the	new	Chinese	leadership	has	represented	
the	deepening	of	economic	reforms	as	a	battle	against	the	vested	































necessary	 for	 their	 success	 and	ability	 to	keep	enriching	 them-







the	 economy	 will	 undermine	 their	 political	 position	 and	 curb	





nary	benefits	 from	access	 to	power.	Thus, the implementation 
of the reforms announced by the new leadership inevitably 
opens a political conflict within the CPC, which will require 
the leaders to become actively involved in overcoming the ad-
ministration’s resistance at the level of central, provincial 









ing	 to	 block	 the	 reforms,	 pledging	 to	 fight	 a	 tough	 battle	 that	
29	 Xi	says	China's	reform	enters	deep-water	zone,	Xinhua,	01.04.2014,	http://
news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-04/01/c_133230720.htm	



































































overcoming	 the	 resistance	 of	 the	 Chinese	 administration	 at	 all	
levels	and	mobilising	its	members.	The current CPC leadership 
views the vested interests embedded in the Chinese state ap-
paratus as the main opponents of reforms, who may actively 
or passively resist the projected thorough restructuring of 
China’s economy.	The activities of the leadership in Beijing 
have been subordinated to the logic of internal conflict since 
2012, necessitating the development of new tools to discipline 
the administration cadres and tighten control of the reform 
process.	
2. Establishment of the Central Leading Group 
for Comprehensively Deepening Reforms
The	new	Chinese	leadership	decided	to	use	the	structures	of	the	





































Xi Jinping’s rise to power within the CPC was followed by 
a re-construction of the network of leading groups operating 
within the CPC Central Committee, as a result of which the 
groups gained a bigger role in the process of economic poli-
cy development.	The	so-called	Central	Leading	Small	Group	for	
Comprehensively	 Deepening	 Reforms,	 established	 by	 the	 third	
plenum	in	2013	to	implement	its	reform	agenda	to	2020,	became	
a	 pivotal	 element	 of	 the	 new	 architecture	 (hereafter:	 Leading	
Group	 for	Deepening	Reforms).	 It	 is	 an	 elaborate	 structure	 and	
has	 its	own	working	 sub-groups	 in	 charge	of	particular	 reform	
areas,	including	a	Subgroup	on	the	Economic	System	and	Ecologi-
cal	Civilisation,	responsible	for	economic	affairs.	The	Group	also	
holds	 a	 senior	position	 role	 in	 relation	 to	 some	existing	 leading	
groups	 and	 has	 taken	 over	 some	 of	 their	 responsibilities.38	The	
Group	meets	 regularly,	 currently	 every	month,	 and	 has	 a	 rela-
tively	 small	 secretariat	 in	 charge	 of	 organising	 work.	 Like	 the	
other	groups,	it	has	a	strongly	hierarchical	structure	in	which	the	
chair,	in	this	case	Xi	Jinping	himself,	holds	a	dominant	position.39
The intention of the Chinese leadership was to make the Lead-
ing Group for Deepening Reforms a key element in the eco-
nomic reform process.	Its	tasks	include	defining	the	directions	of	
reform,	initiating	specific	solutions	and,	importantly,	‘overseeing	













































The Leading Group for Deepening Reforms has become not 
only a new channel for initiating and controlling reforms, 
but also a basic tool for co-ordination between the central 
institutions of China’s administration and for overcom-






























the	key	 central	 institutions.	Many	 important	posts	 in	 the	State	
Council	 (government)	 and	 key	 institutions	 have	 been	 occupied	
by	people	representing	the	interests	of	the	bureaucracy	respon-
sible	for	economic	planning	or	the	interests	of	state-owned	com-
panies,	 or	 indeed	 officials	 burdened	 with	 corruption	 links,	 i.e.	
groups	 less	 enthusiastic	 about	 reform,	 which	 may	 potentially	











the	resistance	of	 the	central	bureaucracy	 to	 the	extent	 the	pro-
































China’s	 largest	 cities	 and	 in	 some	of	 the	 state-owned	enterpris-






leading	 groups	 take	 place	 regularly	 (most	 groups	 have	 already	












































the	 party’s	 popularity	 by	 imposing	 exemplary	 punishments	 on	
corrupt	officials.	The	same	elements	are	also	present	in	the	anti-
corruption	campaign	launched	by	Xi	Jinping	in	2014.47	However, 
the scale and duration of the present campaign are unprec-
edented, which indicates that the campaign is designed as 
a tool to change the political status quo in China, and that is 













































the	 quality	 of	 governance	 of	 SOE	 assets	 and	budget	 spending.50	
The	Central	Disciplinary	Commission	has	been	active	 in	 the	 in-
stitutions	 in	 charge	 of	 economic	 regulations,	 as	well	 as	 several	














The anti-corruption campaign has become a means of exert-





















the rotation of cadres, while at the same time building up Bei-










































iv. thE main challEngEs for rEform
The	 reform	 implementation	 pathway	 adopted	 after	 the	 third	
plenum	in	2013	 largely	relies	on	the	structures	of	 the	Commu-
nist	Party	of	China.	Even	though	the	party’s	main	bodies	have	
also	 previously	 played	 an	 important	 role	 in	 reforms,	 that	 role	
was	largely	limited	to	setting	general	directions	and	taking	key	
political	decisions.	The	strong	powers	of	the	Leading	Group	for	
Comprehensively	 Deepening	 Reforms	 and	 its	 significant	 role	
in	 the	 reform	 ‘transmission	 belt’	 amount	 to	 a	 partial	 adjust-
ment	of	China’s	original	model	of	economic	policy	development.	
Embedded	 in	 the	 CPC	 structures,	 the	 Group	 has	 been	 given	
an	 important	and	partly	 formalised	role	 in	 the	process,	which	
also	 includes	 the	power	 to	 initiate	reforms,	delegate	 tasks	and	
oversee	progress.	This means that – to some degree – the key 
competences have been shifted from the domain of the state 
(government) to the domain of the party, thus disrupting 
the reform implementation mechanisms which have been 
in place for years. The	very	process	has	simultaneously	become	
more	centralised,	with	 the	CPC	 leadership	gaining	more	 influ-
ence	on	the	specific	shape	of	reforms,	at	the	expense	of	the	lo-
cal	administrations.	And	finally,	the	new	model	has	also	given	
Xi	 Jinping	personally	more	 influence	 on	 the	 directions	 of	 eco-

























experimenting,	 which	 had	 been	 in	 place	 for	 several	 decades.55	
Even	 though	 that	 model	 is	 still	 in	 use	 in	 many	 spheres	 of	 the	
state’s	 functioning,	 it	has	been	 implemented	where	 it	 applies	 to	
the	key	issues	named	in	the	third	plenum’s	agenda.	Now	it	is	the	
central	 leadership	 that	 defines	more	 details	 of	 the	 reform	 pro-







the	 central	 government	 and	 local	 administration	 (discussed	 in	
the	next	section),	and	places	a	greater	responsibility	for	detailed	
policy	design	upon	the	central	institutions	in	Beijing.

















































existing	structures	of	 the	party,	 i.e.	within	the	 leading	groups	
whose	original	functions	concerned	co-ordination	and	control,	
but	which	 did	 not	 have	 the	 institutional	 capacity,	 staff	 or	 ex-




portunities	 for	 reforms	 to	 be	 hijacked	 by	 groups	 interested	 in	
preserving	the	status quo,	which	can	use	means	such	as	propos-






































the	 top	CPC	 leadership	 is	willing	and	able	 to	do	 so,	 amplify	 the	
influence	of	selected	reformers,	its	capacity	at	the	level	of	reform	
implementation	is	much	more	limited.





num’s	reforms. As a result, the reforms, which are character-
ised by a conflict of interests between the central authorities 































from	local	vested	 interests,	which	 is	often	raised	 in	China,	may	























































creasingly	rely	on	selling	 land	use	 rights	 (land	 is	owned	by	 the	
state	in	China),	and	transfers	from	the	central	budget.62	The	gap	
between	 local	 revenues	 and	 spending	 needs	 is	 one	 of	 the	main	
sources	of	China’s	 economic	problems	–	 it	 incentivises	 the	 local	
governments	to	stimulate	the	real	estate	markets	(to	ensure	reve-
nues	from	land	rights	sale),	take	on	more	debt	or	encourage	invest-
ments	by	SOEs.	Until alternative sources of budget revenues 
are provided, the local governments will remain determined 





61	 The	 share	 of	 local	 governments	 in	 total	 budget	 revenue	 decreased	 from	
around	70-80%	to	45-50%,	while	 their	share	 in	total	spending	remained	
at	around	65-75%.	See:	Yinqu	Lu	and	Tao	Sun,	Local	Government	Financ-


















knot	of	 local	finance.	Until	 the	 tax	reform	is	completed	and	 the	












3. The Xi factor: personalised economic policy
The party secretary general Xi Jinping has used the deci-
sion-making structure based on leading groups to gain per-
sonal control of the reforms. The concentration of power in 
his hands should be seen as one of the main objectives of the 
changes implemented, and not as an unintended side effect. 
So	much	is	evident	from	the	way	Xi	has	been	gradually	concen-

































economic	 reform	 matters	 is	 limited	 by	 his	 unprecedented	 in-




only	 while	 serving	 as	 the	 governor	 of	 the	 Zhejiang	 and	 Fujian	
provinces.	Unlike	prime	minister	Li,	Xi	has	no	degree	in	econom-
ics,	which	may	lead	to	a	relative	marginalisation	of	the	reforms	



































his	numerous	speeches	and	the	official	documents.65	It should be 
concluded that from the point of view of Xi Jinping and the 
more broadly understood party leadership, the principal ob-
jective of reforms is invariably to consolidate the party’s pow-
er and strengthen its social legitimacy by ensuring a steady 
improvement in living standards across China.66	This	means	
the	Chinese	leaders	will	be	cautious	in	implementing	reforms	that	
involve	a	risk	of	political	instability,	and	such	risk	increases	as	the	




reversed’,	 and	 ‘eliminate	extreme	solutions’.67	 In this interpre-
tation, the Leading Group for the Deepening of Reforms may 
serve Xi as an instrument of total and ‘double-sided’ control 
of the reforms, allowing him to overcome resistance to re-
forms but also to block overly ambitious moves.	That	 is	 im-





































dent)	is	a	departure from the unwritten rule, observed since 
the 1980s, that oversight of economic reforms should be a com-
petence vested in the prime minister who heads the state 


















the	 one	 blocking	 reforms,	 others	 believe	 that	 resistance	 to	 re-
forms	comes	from	the	stimulus	advocate	Li	Keqiang.70	If	there	is	
































tumultuous	 and	 unstable	 economic	 environment	 that	 is	 with-




downs	 in	 the	stock	exchanges	 in	 July	2015	and	 January	2016,	as	
well	as	a	significant	outflow	of	capital	abroad.	China’s entry into 
a period of economic slowdown and deep economic instabil-
ity has prompted the party’s top leadership to change its view 
about the most desired speed and scope of reforms and adopt 
much more cautious positions than in 2013, when the third 
plenum’s agenda was initially announced. The	party	 leaders	












needed.	 In recent years, when the Chinese leadership faced 
major threats, it often opted for deep ad hoc intervention us-





















The	prime	example	of	 this	cautious	approach	on	 the	part	of	 the	
Chinese	 leadership	concerns	the	supply-side	reform,	which	was	
made	a	priority	in	2016.	Unlike the reforms that were included 
in the original third plenum agenda, it is not about resolving 
China’s most urgent economic problems of debt, overproduc-
tion and inefficiency through a broad, structural reconstruc-
tion of the market environment which would then enforce 
adjustment processes by exposing companies to heightened 
competition. Instead, it relies on administrative instru-
ments to administer some ‘bloodletting’ to the Chinese econ-































Given the prospect of a further slackening of GDP growth in 
China, the biggest question is the one concerning the Chinese 





menting	 the	supply-side	reform	on	page	 two	of	 the	government	
newspaper,	Renmin Ribao.	The	commentary	was	published	in	the	




growth,	 decided	 to	 implement	 additional	 stimulus	measures	 in	
late	2015	and	2016.	Among	other	measures,	monetary	policy	was	
eased,	new	infrastructural	projects	were	launched	and	SOEs	con-
siderably	 increased	 investments,	 reinvigorating	 the	 growth	 of	
commodity	prices	and	heavy	industry.	In	the	interview,	the	‘au-
thoritative	 person’	 expressed	 damning	 criticism	 of	 such	 policy,	
describing	 the	 potentially	 ‘lethal’	 threats	 coming	 from	 the	 pil-
ing	up	of	debt	(risks	for	the	financial	markets,	recession,	 loss	of	
savings	by	the	public)	and	arguing	that	short-term	stimulus	was	




















































contributed	 to	 this	 included	defects	 in	 the	new	reform	architec-

















important	party	bodies	 and	 central	 state	 administration	 institu-
tions.75	That	would	lead	to	people	associated	with	Xi’s	circle	being	
appointed	to	key	posts,	which	would	facilitate	building	consensus	





























tinued	 use	 of	 stimulus	measures	 in	 recent	 years	 has	made	 the	
situation	of	the	Chinese	economy	even	more	complicated.	In or-
der to fix the foundations of the economy by resuming the 
agenda of the third plenum, the CPC leaders will have to 
commit considerable organisational and political resources, 
which they consequently will not be able to use in other ar-
eas of state governance. The fate of reforms will thus depend 
on the individual calculations of Xi Jinping and his circle, 
who will have to weigh the long-term benefits for the state 
and party that returning to path of stable growth could of-
fer against the short-term benefits that can be gained by re-
solving ad hoc problems.	 In	 that	 sense,	 the	 success	of	 reforms	
will	depend	primarily	on	the	dynamics	of	China’s	GDP	growth,	as	
well	as	the	minimum	growth	threshold	below	which	the	Chinese	
leadership	would	opt	for	stimulus	again.	The	reforms	are	likely	to	
be	affected	by	unpredictable	economic	phenomena,	such	as	sud-
den	breakdowns	in	the	shaky	financial	markets	or	shocks	in	the	
global	economy,	i.e.	the	kind	of	events	which	the	Chinese	leader-
ship	to	date	typically	strove	to	resolve	at	the	expense	of	its	reform	
agenda.	Preserving	growth	‘at	any	cost’	could	be	one	of	the	tools	
to	ease	the	internal	social	tensions.	Finally,	unpredicted	external	
developments	may	also	be	an	important	factor,	such	as	a	rise	in	
international	political	tensions,	which	might	prompt	the	Chinese	
leadership	to	continue	the	unsustainable	stimulus	policy	in	order	
to	be	able	to	maintain	room	for	manoeuvre	in	foreign	policy.
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